A Land of Strangers : Communitarianism and the Rejuvenation of Intermediate Associations by Brown, Derek E.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 4 Article 6
6-15-2001
"A Land of Strangers": Communitarianism and the
Rejuvenation of Intermediate Associations
Derek E. Brown
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Judges
Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Derek E. Brown "A Land of Strangers": Communitarianism and the Rejuvenation of Intermediate Associations, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 4
(2001)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/6




Buried deep in our rights dialect is an unexpressed premise that we roam
at large in a land of strangers, where we presumptively have no
obligations toward others except to avoid the active infliction of harm.'
I. INTRODUCTION
After coming to America in 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville observed:
"Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of dispositions are forever
forming associations... of a thousand different types, religious, moral, serious,
futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute."2
Additionally, de Tocqueville philosophized that the "most natural privilege of
man, next to the right of acting for himself, is that of combining his exertions with
those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with them. The right of
Association therefore ... [is] as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal
liberty."
3
In America's formative years, these civic associations to which de Tocqueville
referred served as cornerstones of the emergent republic's stability. They also
served as the primary means through which its denizens obtained social
interaction, moral instruction, and a heightened ability to shape the political
process through the combination of their individual efforts.4 In de Tocqueville's
own words, "Nothing, in my view, deserves more attention than the intellectual
and moral associations in America."5
As a new century closes, however, "we are again faced with a haunting feeling
1. MARYANN GLENDON, RIGHTSTALK:THEIMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICALDISCOURSE, 13 (1993).
2. ALExIS DE ToCQuEvIIxL, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 196 (Dowden Bradley ed., 1954).
3. Id.
4. Such collective involvement in the governmental process was, in part, what Aristotle had
encouraged in Politics: "If liberty and equality ... are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be
attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost." Margaret Stimmann Branson &
Charles N. Quigley, The Role of Civic Education, (quoting ARISTOTLE, POLrTICs 37 (Canes Lord trans.,
1984), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-ccps/popciv.html (last visited April 22, 2001).
5. Civic Participation: Does it Make Better Communities?, LA JOLLA INSTITUTE, available at
www.lajollainstitute.org (citing ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 196 (Dowden Bradley
ed., 1954) (last visited Mar. i, 1998).
that things have gone awry in our democratic institutions."6 The very institution
that initially was comprised "of the people" and governed "by the people" has
gradually expanded in size, causing a concomitant erosion of the very
organizations in which America's genius lie: its civic, or "intermediate,"
associations.7 As Robert Nisbet has warned, "to destroy the authority of
intermediate communities and groups in the name of freeing their members from
domination destroys the only buffer between the individual and the state, and risks
enslaving the individual to the state's potential tyranny ..."'
Myriad examples exist to support this thesis. Perhaps the quintessential
example of an institution struggling to maintain its identity in the wake of this
trend is the Boy Scouts of America ("BSA"). In 1998, the California Supreme
Court overturned a lower court decision which had held that the Boy Scouts of
America must extend admission to atheists, thus forcing them to accept
individuals who do not share their religious beliefs.9 On August 4, 1999, the New
Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the BSA also must admit homosexual scout
leaders, in spite of the organization's highly-criticized yet long-standing
opposition to homosexual behavior.'0 Apparently, this was too intrusive on its
First Amendment rights, as the Supreme Court overturned this highly publicized
and extremely controversial decision shortly thereafter.11 This trend, nonetheless,
has already affected many other private voluntary organizations such as Moose
Lodges," the Jaycees, 3 and the Rotary Club. 4 Many venerable, exclusively male
organizations have also been forced by the judiciary to accept women as full
members."
6. Robert D. Putnam & William B. Parent, The Dawn ofan OldAge?, WASH. POST, June 23, 1991,
at B5.
7. As these voluntary associations tend to act as a buffer between the most basic association, the
family, and the government, this Comment will refer collectively to these voluntary associations by the
nomenclature "intermediate associations."
8. William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Rights of Association, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 68, 69
(1986) (quoting Robert Nisbet) (italics added).
9. The boys, represented by the ACLU of Southern California, refused to take the Boy Scout oath due
to its mention of the word "God." The twin brothers, first at the age of nine, stated that they considered
themselves atheists and did not feel comfortable taking an oath to God. The court ruled that the Boy Scouts
of America is a business subject to the anti-discrimination protections of California's Unruh Civil Rights
Act, and thus must admit these boys in spite of the fact that they do not share the Boy Scouts convictions.
This decision, however, was recently overturned. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts
of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998). Greg Shields, attorney for the Boy Scouts, stated: "We are a voluntary
association to which no one is forced to belong and are thus entitled to First Amendment protections
guaranteeing us the right to association." Jeremy Leaming, Twins Who Refuse to Take Oath Picked to
Receive Eagle ScoutBadges, at http://www.freedomforum.org/religion/1998/3/18 (visited Mar. 3, 1998).
10. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1109 (2000),
rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
II. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
12. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
13. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
14. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
15. See id.
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This proliferation of government intrusion has gone well beyond simply
shaping intermediate associations; it has proceeded to the most basic association
of all: the family. Some examples of this trend are instructive. In late 1999, the
Massachusetts Department of Social Services filed child abuse charges against a
Christian pastor for simply spanking his son.' 6 These charges were filed
notwithstanding the factual finding that "there was no injury to this child," and
in spite of the parent's pleading that punishment was "mild, loving, routine, [and]
structured."' 7 An agency of the California state government engaged in the
pervasive practice of conducting invasive body searches of children without first
receiving parental permission, which was the subject of a recent Ninth Circuit
case.' De Tocqueville presciently observed that stripping responsibility from
families and communities and allowing it to be placed in a centralized
governmental system "enervates" man and makes him "indifferent to the fate of
the spot which he inhabits," thus causing him to view "the condition of his village
. . . [as something that does] not concern him and [is] unconnected with
himself."' 9 This Comment will analyze the symptoms and the root of what Robert
Putnam has designated the "strange disappearance of Civic America,"'2 and then
will examine the solutions that have been proposed by the Communitarian
movement.
Part II will discuss how intermediate organizations in society act as a buffer
16. Alexis Chiu,Alabama Native Says Corporal Punishment is God-given Right, AssociATED PRESS,
Aug.29, 1998.
17. Mass High Court Weighs Whether Spanking is Discipline or Abuse, ASSOCIATED PRESS, at
http://cnn.com/US/9909/14/minister.spanking (last modified Sept. 14, 1999); see also Martin Finucane,
Massachusetts High Court Tries Father for Spanking, FROM TIME TO TIME: NANDO'S IN-DEPTH LOOK
AT THE 20TH CENTURY, (last visited Sep. 14, 1999).
18. Henry Weinstein, Parents' Rights Upheld in Child Abuse Inquiries, L.A.TIMES, Sept. 15,1999,
at A3. In the majority opinion written by Judge Stephen Reinhardt, he explained that this case involved "a
conflict between the legitimate role of the state in protecting children from abusive parents and the rights
of children and parents to be free from arbitrary and undue governmental influence." Id. In DeShaney
v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Supreme Court jumped headlong into the briar patch of
parent/child issues. Joshua DeShaney was a boy who was beaten by his father "so severely that he fell into
a life-threatening coma." Id. at 193. The Supreme Court's holding recognized the constant tension between
the government's right to intervene for safety reasons and families' right to be free from such intrusion:
The most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is that they stood by and did
nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them. In defense of them
it must also be said that had they moved too soon to take custody of the son away from the
father, they would likely have been met with charges of improperly intruding into the parent-
child relationship ....
Id. at 203. (Rehnquist, C.J.)
19. See DE TocQuEvi.E, supra note 2, at 212.
20. See Putam & Parent, supra note 6.
between the government and family- the most basic unit of society.2 Part III will
discuss at length civic America's disappearance, proffering suggestions for the
underlying cause of this recent phenomenon.22 Part IV of this Comment will
review the background and briefly describe the importance of the high Court's
opinion in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.23 Part V will discuss how the
impoverishment of our political discourse has been a significant factor in this
strange disappearance.24 It will focus on the legal analysis the Court has used to
justify its intrusion into intermediate associations via the First Amendment. Part
VI will discuss the two competing interests courts have painstakingly endeavored
to reconcile: freedom and equality.2" Part VII will then review the recent birth
and blossoming of Communitarianism and the subtle impact it has had on both the
legal and philosophical discourse of First Amendment litigation.26 Part VIII will
conclude by suggesting how a synthesis of both our current First Amendment
landscape and Communitarianism yields a remarkably workable picture for
reinvigorating the remarkable diversity of American culture and rediscovering
what de Tocqeville labeled "habits of the heart." It will propose that the rich
diversity of American culture has been weakened by a judiciary marching,
ironically, to the drumbeat of diversity, yet imposing a majoritarian uniformity
nonetheless.27
II. INTERMEDIATE ORGANIZATIONS AS A BUFFER
Any social structure may artificially be divided, for didactic purposes, into
three overarching societal systems: the government, intermediate associations,
and the family.28 The second of these may be termed voluntary, or intermediate,
associations, due to their role as an intermediary, or buffer, between families and
either the state or society as a whole.29 While such a tripartite division may have
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra, Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part VI.
26. See infra Part VII.
27. See infra Part VIII.
28. While the individual may, perhaps, also be viewed by some as the most basic of social "units," the
analysis in this paper still is applicable in light of that definitional change, as for the purposes of this
Comment a societal unit comprises one or more individuals. Many Communitarians, incidentally, view the
family as an intermediate association in light of that definitional change. Either way, the analysis herein
presents a viable approach to the study of weakening social organizations.
29. ROBERTA. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUrONOMY VS. CONTROL 1-40 (1982).
Although the phrase "intermediate associations" is often used to refer to organizations that mediate between
individuals and the state, this Comment intentionally takes a more narrow view of the concept of state.
"State" has, in this context, often been used in reference not only to the government, but also "society," "the
public," or "community." One commentator has recently discussed, in the context of American federalism,
how the states may be viewed as an intermediate association mitigating between families and the federal
government. While all of these definitions have merit, this paper will use the narrower view of the state to
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seemed more self-evident in a small, participatory city-state such as Rousseau's
Geneva,' an exegesis is necessary for an extended conglomeration of "city-states"
as exists in the United States.31
Examples of intermediate forms of community abound: churches, soccer
leagues, country clubs, orchestras, parent teacher associations, college fraternities,
political parties, corporations, as well as groups such as the Kiwanis Club, Lions
Club, and Elks Club. 2 A recent self-styled academic movement known as
Communitarianism has surfaced, attempting to help restore the delicate balance
of rights and responsibilities between these intermediate associations, the family,
and the state.33 The tacit recognition that human beings are innately social
animals is at the heart of this movement. 4 Communitarians promote a view of
rights somewhat different from that of Locke, Jefferson, or Madison, and more in
line with the tradition of Hegel, who felt that the community is more real than the
individual.35
The very existence of intermediate organizations has recently come under
both legal and academic attack. Not only has their effectiveness arguably been
minimized through an activist judiciary, but its members are often disparaged as
roving bands of "self-interested Hobbesean rent-seekers" that merely amplify
individual desires, or worse, act as merely "extra-political vehicles for republican
deliberation or dialogue."36  Their autonomy has tapered under recent anti-
discrimination, statutes and rights-oriented legislation, which has further
concentrated power in the state, thus reducing the vitality and diversity of our
refer to the governmental structure (at both state and federal levels) as the "state." See, e.g., BOB JESSOP,
STATE THEORY: PUrING THE CAPITALIST STATE IN rrs PLACE 341-43 (1990).
30. "Rousseau idealized his native Geneva as a model of republican self-government." Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1713 n. 1 (1988).
31. See generally Sullivan, supra note 30.
32. Gregory F. Hauser, Intimate Associations Under the Law: The Rights of Social Fraternities to
Exist and to be Free From Undue Interference by Host Institutions, 24 J.C. & U.L. 59 (1997). These
intermediate associations comprise the collective interests, hobbies, and objectives of the community as a
whole. For this reason, the number of sizes, shapes, and purposes for which these associations are formed
are as myriad as human beings themselves. See id. Other examples include the Girl Scouts, Moose Club,
Sons of Norway, and the Ku Klux Klan. See generally Douglas 0. Linder, Comment, Freedom of
Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1878 (1984).
33. See infra Part III.
34. See id.
35. Norton Garfinkle, A Message from the Institute Chairman, Institute for Communitarian Policy,
available at www.gwu.edu/-icps/about.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2001). Worthy of note is the fact that
many Communitarians are primarily anti-individualist, and are much more concerned with promoting the
mega-community than intermediate associations. See id.
36. Sullivan, supra note 30, at 1716.
public sphere.37 These associations fulfill roles in the community which would
otherwise be filled by the state, and by increasing their activities and effectiveness,
they essentially act as a buffer between families and the state.3" Furthermore, these
associations fulfill needs more effectively than the state could, giving this
participatory process an added benefit that de Tocqueville also delineated:
"Feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind
is developed only by the reciprocal influence of men upon one another."39 The
power of the judiciary to change the membership of an association is the power to
change its purpose, ideology, and collective voice.'
II. THE STRANGE DISAPPEARANCE OF CIVIC AMERICA
The intrusion by the state into the policies and practices of private
organizations has exacted a disturbing toll on both the number and membership
37. Justice Douglas had this to say concerning anti-discrimination statutes and the right to discriminate:
My view of the First Amendment and the related guarantees of the Bill of Rights is that they
create a zone of privacy which precludes government from interfering with private clubs or
groups. The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all black, all brown,
and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish or all agnostic clubs
to be established. Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be.
The individual can be as selective as he desires.
Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In another case involving the Moose Lodge of St. George, Utah, the Utah Supreme Court held that
a state statute prohibiting discrimination based upon gender was applicable to this private, voluntary
organization. While the court agreed that this organization was expressive, and a private organization run
solely with private funds, the lynchpin was the fact that the Moose Lodge served alcoholic beverages. As
a place where alcohol was served, the Moose Lodge was therefore regulated by the state's alcohol laws. In
an opinion by Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Durham, the Court held that the state could appreciably
increase its statutory boundaries and apply the public accommodation statute to a private organization. The
rationale for this decision-exactly the type Communitarians fear most-was that because the Moose Lodge
served alcohol, and alcohol was regulated by the state, they were receiving a "benefit" because of the state.
Because of this "jurisdictional hook," the state gave itself carte blanche to intrude upon its operations, and
force a private organization to comply with a public accommodation statute. See generally Beynon v. St.
George-Dixie Lodge Order of Elks, 854 P.2d 513 (1993).
38. Interestingly, these intermediate associations buffer the family from the state, but not vice versa.
If viewed in a continuum, with the family at the bottom and the government at the top, intrusion always
proceeds in a downward direction. Liberal legislation continually presses downward to expand the scope
and influence of the government, and thus usurps power from intermediate associations as well as the
families. Hence, the buffer that exists in the form of these organizations is a one-way buffer. Voluntary
organizations exist, however, insisting that the government should be protected from upward-moving
intrusion by these intermediate organizations. An example would be Americans for the Separation of
Church and State, an organization whose objective is to shield the government from an"upward-moving"
intrusion of voluntary organizations such as religious institutions.
39. Civic Participation: Does it Make Better Communities?, supra note 5, at 1.
40. Appellant's Brief, Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, at 13. As
Professor Linder has acknowledged, "nothing strikes closer to the heart of American pluralism than a law
which tells an association who it must accept as a member." Linder, supra note 32, at 1902.
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levels of these organizations.' American social scientists of a neo-Tocquevillean
tradition have recently unearthed an array of empirical evidence suggesting what
we intuitively understand-the quality of our public life is powerfully affected by
our networks of civic engagement. 42 Furthermore, these networks also powerfully
affect the performance of a representative government.43
One of the preeminent scientists studying this area is Harvard's Robert D.
Putnam.' Putnam's watershed report on social capital, "Bowling Alone," was
titled in response to his somewhat whimsical finding that from 1980 to 1993
league bowling declined by forty percent while the number of bowlers rose by ten
percent.45 The rest of his evidence is "less whimsical": voter turnout, attendance
at community meetings, and church attendance have also declined sharply from
1974 to 1989.' Collectively, "[s]erious volunteering declined by roughly one-
sixth from 1974 to 1989."' 7 If such a finding is accurate, it surely does not bode
well for the stability of civic America's intermediate associations.
Putnam coined the phrase "social capital" in reference to the traditional
features of social life-networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants to act
together more effectively to pursue shared objectives.4 While it is roughly
analogous to other physical assets-financial capital or human capital-social
capital primarily inheres in interpersonal relations.49 For Putnam, the leading
41. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America 's Declining Social Capital, JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY
(Jan. 1995). See also Robert D. Putnam, The Prosperous Community, JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY (Spring
1993).
42. Civic Participation: Does it Make Communities Better?, supra note 5, at 2.
43. See id.
44. Robert D. Putnam, The Strange Disappearance of Civic America, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, No.
24 (Winter 1996), available at http://www.prospect.org/ archives/24/24putn.html (last visited Apr. 22,
2001).
45. See id. at 4.
46. See id.
47. Civic Participation: Does It Make Better Communities?, supra note 5.
48. Putnam, supra note 44, at 1. Putnam, with his usual eloquence, refers to this disappearance:
It is a classic brainteaser, with a corpus delicti, a crime scene strewn with clues, and many
potential suspects. As in all good detective stories, however, some plausible miscreants turn out
to have impeccable alibis, and some important clues hint at portentous developments that
occurred before the curtain rose. The mystery concerns the strange disappearance of social
capital and civic engagement in America. By "social capital," I mean features of social
life-networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants to act together more effectively to
pursue shared objectives .... I use the term "civic engagement" to refer to people's connections
with the life of their communities, not only with politics.
Id.
49. Civic Participation, Does It Make Better Communities?, supra note 5, at 3. Lest one believe that
the phrase "social capital" only sounds economic, Putnam in Civic Participation, insists that actual
economic vitality also rests on a "cultural bedrock of local associational strength." Id.
indicator of this social capital is membership in voluntary organizations.' Putnam
conducted an exhaustive study listing the "usual suspects" that may have
effectuated the disappearance of social capital: increasing time pressures,
suburbanization, women moving into the labor force, disruption of marriage,
growth of the welfare state, and even the appearance of television.5 He further
hypothesizes that the strongest correlation between an individual and her level of
involvement is found in the individual's level of education.52 When comparing the
present generation with past generations, Putnam suggests that empirical evidence
shows that today we are less connected with one another. 3
Putnam's thesis, nonetheless, may have several notable oversights. First, his
data does not necessarily take into account the changing nature of American
society, as well as many intermediate organizations that have either grown in
membership or materialized in the last two decades.' As an example, U.S. Youth
Soccer, a group not measured by his data, has grown from 1.2 million to 2.4
million members in the last ten years. 5 His data also does not measure episodic
50. During time-budgeting studies which were conducted in 1965, 1975, and 1985, they discovered
that time spent on informal socializing and visiting declined by 25%, while time devoted to clubs and
organizations declined by approximately 50%. Putnam, supra note 44, at 2. This data is bolstered by the
decline of between 25% and 50% in members of such organizations as the PTA, the Elks club, the League
of Women Voters, the Red Cross, and labor unions. See id. Other groups which have been affected include
sports clubs, literary discussion groups, and churches. See id.
51. See id. at 3. Putnam, interestingly, concludes that he feels the prime suspect is the rise of the
television. See id. "Most studies estimate that the average American now watches roughly four hours per
day," and he concludes that this constitutes almost one-half of the average American's spare time. Id.
Interestingly, Putnam finds a link between civic engagement and either television watching or newspaper
reading. See id. "The basic contrast is straightforward: Newspaper reading is associated with high social
capital, TV viewing with low social capital." Id. at 16.
52. See id. In explaining this interesting correlation, Putnam suggests:
The four years of education between 14 and 18 total years have ten times more impact on trust
and membership than the first four years of formal education ... but, when income, social
status, and education are used together to predict trust and group membership, education
continues to be the primary influence. So, well-educated people are much more likely to be
joiners and trusters, partly because they are better off economically, but mostly because of the
skills, resources, and inclinations that were imparted to them at home and in school.
Id.
53. See id. Putnam suggests that we compare the present generation with past generations and not with
other nations, because America still outranks many nations in the level of community involvement. Id.
An interesting study indeed would involve an analysis in the levels of community involvement in other
countries vis-a-vis the type of governmental structure. Communitarian theory would surely predict an
increase in community involvement in more democratically-run countries such as Canada, with a
corresponding decrease in community involvement in countries with a more top-down system like that
utilized in China. It would be interesting to discover whether empirical data verifies such a theoretical
presumption, or if the reverse is true.
54. Putnam relies on data derived from the General Social Survey ("GSS"), which does not take into
consideration several types of civic activity which have arisen in the last two decades. See id.
55. Civic Participation: Does it Make Better Communities?, supra note 5. Furthermore, it does not
measure membership in national organizations such as the Sierra Club or the National Rifle Association.
Seeid. Another example where the GSS would fall short consists of the trend ofjoining local gyms to work
out, where two decades ago people would have gone to the local YMCA. See id. This recent explosion in
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political involvement, as in 1992 when 800,000 motorcycle riders became involved
in a law requiring bikers to wear helmets.56 While many of these examples would
not necessarily qualify as classic Tocquevillean democracy, these organizations are
certainly a "highly efficient use of civic energy."57
Putnam's clarion call for "community" has traditionally been viewed by many,
understandably, with a healthy dose of suspicion. After all, "Calvin, Rousseau,
Marx, and Hitler have cast a long shadow on communitarian dreams."58 "Ever
since Aristotle distinguished between master and slave by asserting the former's
ability to recognize and comprehend the common good," the world has never had
a shortage of leaders claiming to understand the common good and seeking to
impose their view of the common good upon their community.5
Putnam's call for community, however, is not misguided. He too, seeks to
impose a conception of the common good derived from the community at large.
His diagnosis is precise, and his prescription-an increase in social involvement-is
salutary. One area he neglects to examine, which undoubtedly is a potent force on
our social culture, is the focus on individual legal rights and the judiciary's slow
erosion of the autonomy of the very civic organizations Putnam extolls.' The
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America,
which was reversed by the Supreme Court, is perhaps the quintessential example
of the American judiciary hastening this very slow, yet perceptible, process of
erosion."
IV. BoY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE
James Dale entered scouting at the age of eight and continued until he
obtained the rank of Eagle Scout in 1988.62 In 1990, a newspaper published an
interview with Dale, identifying him as the co-president of the Rutgers University
Lesbian/Gay Alliance.63 Shortly thereafter, while he was acting as an adult leader
gym membership would not offset the GSS's reporting that membership in YMCAs has declined. See id.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Linda C. Raeder, Liberalism and the Common Good: A Hayekian Perspective on
Communitarianism, THE INDEP. REV. 519,520 (1998).
59. Id.
60. The most charitable explanation for his omission of these two factors lies in the fact that (I) the
focus on individual rights is implicit within the discussion of the factors he delineates in his "usual suspects"
list; and (2) the government's impact is discussed elsewhere, namely, in context of the events of the sixties,
the growth of the welfare state, and especially the civil rights revolution.
61. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
62. Id. at 1204.
63. Id. at 1204-05.
with responsibilities over a "troop" of teenage boys, BSA revoked his membership
in their organization.' 4 Two years later, Dale filed a complaint against the BSA in
New Jersey Superior Court, alleging that they had violated New Jersey's public
accommodation statute by revoking his membership based upon his sexual
orientation.65
Seven years later, in 1999, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Dale, holding that BSA's "large size, nonselectivity, [and] inclusive rather than
exclusive purpose... establish that the organization is not 'sufficiently personal
or private to warrant constitutional protection' under the freedom of intimate
association." '
In a five-to-four decision on June 28, 2000, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the New Jersey decision, holding that Dale's presence in BSA would, at
the very least, force BSA to send a message that it accepts homosexual conduct as
a legitimate form of behavior.67 BSA, it held, "has a First Amendment right to
choose to send one message but not the other. 6 8 The Court reasoned that "it is not
free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved
message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose
may strike the government."'69
Justice Stevens, in a vigorous dissent, discussed the changing social mores
regarding homosexual behavior, arguing that BSA's actions did not deserve
constitutional protection, in part, because homosexuality has gained greater social
acceptance.7' The majority was quick to remind that "this is scarcely an argument
for denying First Amendment protection to those who refuse to accept these
views."'" Justice Stevens was also persuaded by the fact that BSA's Official
Handbook and the Scout Oath only require a scout to be "morally straight," and
do not specifically discuss homosexuality.72 Interestingly, the myriad official BSA
statements expressing disapproval with homosexual conduct were, presumably,
not viewed by Justice Stevens as being either authoritative, or even persuasive."
The majority responded by saying that BSA was in a much better position to
determine and interpret its own core values than are the courts.74 The Court
64. Id. at 1205.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1221 (quoting Bd. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987)).
67, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2454 (2000).
68. Id. at 2455.
69. Id. at 2458 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 579 (1995)).
70. Id. at 2476-77. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2457.
72. Id. at 2461 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 2461 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2453 ("[W]e give deference to an association's assertions regarding the nature of its
expression .... ). Justice Stevens' argument, roughly speaking, was that opposition to homosexual conduct
was not very important to the BSA, or, presumably, the BSA would have codified such opposition in the
official Handbook. See id. at 2461-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This argument seems somewhat facetious
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recognized, therefore, that while BSA's position may not be aligned with popular
culture, it nevertheless is still protected by the First Amendment's freedom of
association." Though this decision was uniformly criticized by the main stream
media, and will no doubt be the subject of derision by innumerable academicians
in the years to come, it nonetheless reaffirmed the validity of the First Amendment
for the groups that need it most: those in the minority
V. THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
The current paradigm of the American polity is one that is centered on rights.
While we trace our idea of historical conception of rights to Locke, Blackstone,
and Hobbes, the current spirit of American "rights-talk" was captured by Thomas
Merton:
We are like billiard balls bumping against each other. The American
idea, which was built up in the eighteenth century, likewise assumes that
is how people are. Everybody is an individual and he operates from this
center where he is completely separated from everybody else, but he still
obeys the traffic laws.76
This individualistic paradigm, at its core, appears to strike a harmonious balance
between the prevention of societal anarchy and the continued pursuit of personal
pleasure enunciated by Freud.77 In a more pragmatic sense, Merton has merely
diagnosed the malady affecting America: chronic selfishness. This malady
manifests itself in the "'dialect' in which Americans talk about rights."7
Conspicuously present in the deafening debate over the word "rights" is [a] "near-
aphasia concerning responsibilities .... ,
Mary Ann Glendon, a professor at Harvard Law School, together with Amitai
Etzioni and William Galson, drafted what has been called the Communitarian
considering that the BSA has, through the years, spent thousands of dollars litigating several near-identical
cases, and was appealing its case before the Supreme Court precisely because it is important to the BSA.
It seems almost axiomatic to say that an organization that spends countless dollars and over 10 years
enforcing its right to express a view on homosexual behavior, presumably considers the issue "important."
75. Id. at 2454.
76. THOMAS MERTON, THOMAS MERTON IN ALASKA 132 (1988).
77. Freud wrote that "our entire psychical activity is bent upon procuring pleasure and avoiding pain."
MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE GREAT IDEAS, Vol. 54, Freud, 639-40 (1952).
78. Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutionalism of Mary Ann Glendon, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1333, 1340 (1998).
79. Joan T. Brown, Recent Publications, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 297 (1992) (citing
GLENDON, supra note 1, at 11).
platform.8" Her seminal work, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political
Discourse, discusses how the grammar and vocabulary of American rights-talk has
crippled political discourse in America."' This rights "dialect," she wrote, "seems
to condone acceptance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state,
without accepting the corresponding personal and civic obligations."82 Such a
discourse is inhospitable to losers, and fosters a zero-sum mentality, as evidenced
in holdings of cases such as Roe v. Wade. 3 This mentality projects an image of
a human being as simply a "lone rights-bearer. '
Glendon suggests that what has brought us to this point is our manner of
appropriating Locke's conception of "property" as the more absolute model for
rights individuals have against each other and the government.85 Blackstone, she
explains, "taught us to absolutize property rights," while Mill taught us, by
analogy, to absolutize liberty.86 Against this philosophical backdrop, she posits
Rousseau's far more limited view of the rights of property, namely "that an owner
is a kind of trustee or steward for the public good."87 She credits Rousseau's
influence for the differing conception of property rights seen in Europe.88 An
example of this is the West German basic law of 1949 which provides: "Property
imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal."89
This current dialogue transforms our political discourse into a "clash of
solipsisms"' in which individuals are, as Putnam lamented, cut off from
"denominational commitments, neighborhood networks ... and other forms of
community and association."'" Importantly, Glendon imputes partial
responsibility for this loss of community to the Supreme Court, which has
contributed to the collective loss of social capital by putting up fences around
80. Carmen Sirianni & Lewis Friedland, Communitarianism, The Civic Practices Network, available
at http://www.cpn.org/sections/tools/models/ communitarianism.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2001).
81. See GLENDON, supra note 1.
82. The central thesis of Professor Glendon's book is captured in the following quote:
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict,
and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the
discovery of common ground. In its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone
acceptance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without accepting the
corresponding personal and civic obligations. In its relentless individualism, it fosters a climate
that is inhospitable to society's losers, and that systematically disadvantages caretakers and
dependents, young and old. In its neglect of civil society, it undermines the principal seedbeds
of civic and personal virtue.
Id. at 14.
83. Kommers, supra note 78, at 1340-41.
84. Id. at 1341.
85. ROBERT E. RODES, BOOKs REVIEWED, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 411, 412 (1995).
86. Id.
87. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 34.
88. Id.
89. James Boyd White, Looking at Our Language: Glendon on Rights, 90 MicH. L. REV. 1267,1269
(1992) (citing GLENDON, supra note 1, at 39).
90. RODES, supra note 85, at 411.
91. Kommers, supra note 78, at 1340.
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individuals and "regarding them as isolated units free to do anything they please
so long as they do no physical harm to other persons."'  The judiciary has also
played a role in stripping individuals from the buffer offered by robust
intermediate associates through its emasculation of those associations' autonomy.93
VI. FREEDOM Vs. EQUALITY: THE ANCIENT PARADOX OF LIBERALISM
The constitutional freedom to choose with whom one associates has, until
recently, been a hallmark of the American legal system. 4  In Democracy in
America, de Tocqueville discussed America's penchant for association-forming,
asserting that "[tihe most natural right of man, after that of acting on his own, is
that of combining his efforts with those of his fellows and acting together."95 As
Justice O'Connor has suggested, an association's right to define its membership
stems "from the recognition that the formation of an expressive association is the
creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of that voice."'
However, the granting of such a right, when considered with the equally American
ideal of equality, bristles with theoretical conflict, for implicit within the right to
associate is the concomitant right not to associate. The dark side of this "right of
dissociation" was eloquently captured by Justice Goldberg:
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the
constitutional right of every person to close his home or club to any
person or to choose his social intimates and business partners solely on
the basis of personal prejudices including race. These and other rights
pertaining to privacy and private association are themselves
constitutionally protected liberties.97
92. Id. at 1341.
93. See infra Part V.
94. Justice Brennan identified two sources of the American protection for associational freedoms: the
First Amendment (implicit in the right to engage in expressive activities) and the Fourteenth Amendment
(implicit in an individual's right to privacy). See Linder, supra note 32, at 1884.
95. DETocQUEVILiE, supra note 2, at 178.
96. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 486 U.S. 609,633 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Paul Varela, Note, A Scout is Friendly: Freedom of Association and the State Effort to End
Discrimination, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919,922 (1989) (quoting Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,313
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)). Notice Justice Goldberg's "rights talk"-the focus of each sentence in
this quote is on individual rights.
This Comment should not be viewed as a condition of discrimination. Discrimination in any setting
is regrettable and should not be tolerated. However, what distinguishes America from other countries is the
fact that the First Amendment permits both individuals and groups to believe ideas which may be repulsive
to the public at large.
This tension between associational freedom and equality is reminiscent of a
larger tension discussed earlier, the tension between right-oriented egalitarianism
and Communitarianism, as well as the tension between pluralism and
assimilation.98 This tug-of-war between freedom and equality is what Professor
Tribe has termed "the ancient paradox of liberalism."'
A. Civil Rights Laws
To eradicate invidious discrimination in public (not private) locales-an
unfortunate, albeit existing byproduct of the freedom to associate-both the U.S.
government and individual states have enacted public accommodations acts
("PAA").s ° While these laws have had the unfortunate effect of intruding upon
a private group's membership practices, the intrusion has commonly been viewed
as a necessary intrusion because PAAs encourage the eradication of discrimination
and help strike a harmonious balance between both First Amendment freedoms
and the prevention of harms caused by the exercise of those freedoms.' 0'
Congress passed the first civil rights act in 1866 to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment." 2 While the Supreme Court originally interpreted the 1866 Act to
apply only to acts of public discrimination, its application was later broadened to
also include private acts of discrimination."13 In 1964, Congress enacted section
2000(a) of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to eliminate further
98. Douglas 0. Linder, Comment, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
82 MICH L. REV. 1878, 1881-82 (1984). This tension between pluralism and assimilation is one which is
not frequently discussed, and is seldom recognized by those advocating both of these values. See id. For
this reason, those pushing for the application of public accommodation statutes to intermediate associations
are not always willing to admit that such a forced assimilation is necessarily accompanied by a concomitant
reduction in pluralism. See id. Thus, two shibboleths of classical liberal philosophy appear to be in
diametrical opposition. See id.
99. William P. Marshall, "'Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 68,69
(1986) (quoting LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL LAW 974 (1 st ed. 1978)). Citing Robert
Nisbet, Tribe has opined:
[T]o destroy the authority of intermediate communities and groups in the name of freeing their
members from domination destroys the only buffer between the individual and the state, and
risks enslaving the individual to the state's potential tyranny .... [On the other hand,]
submerging persons in the intermediate communities and groups that seek dominion over their
lives creates the risk that individuals will remain at the mercy of hierarchical and subjugating
social structures.
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 898 (1 st ed. 1978).
100. Varela, supra note 97, at 919.
101. Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 195 (1984).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994) (incorporating the Civil Rights Act of 1866). In In re Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883), the Court stated that the this amendment was passed for the "obliteration and
prevention of slavery with all its badges and incidents." Notwithstanding, the Court proceeded to strike
down the first federal public accommodation act. Id. at 26.
103. While In re Civil Rights Cases held that a remedy was only available for a denial of civil rights by
the state, id. at 17-18, later cases such as Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-39 (1968),
broadened the application of the civil rights statute to include private real estate transactions under the
auspices of section 1982.
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discrimination in "places of public accommodation."" This was done "to remove
the daily affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access to
facilities ostensibly open to the public."' 5 Forty years ago, the Supreme Court
held that the "freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the . . . Fourteenth
Amendment."'" Since that time, the Supreme Court has proceeded to apply these
PAAs more broadly and, in so doing, has slowly asphyxiated the very
organizations buffering families from the government. 7
B. Organizations Exempt from Public Accommodation Acts
In the seminal case Roberts v. United States Jaycees,"° the Court redefined
discrimination laws and delineated two tests to determine whether an organization
would be afforded immunity from those laws."° The Court held that the Jaycees,
a private male organization, did not pass either of these tests and thus must admit
women. 
10
The first test helps determine whether the group constitutes an "intimate
association.""' The Court has long recognized that it must protect the "formation
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in part:
(a) Equal Access. All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground
of race, color, religion, or national origin ....
(e) Private establishments. The provision of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or
other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such
establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the
scope of subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
105. Edward Bigham, Recent Decision, Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993),
67 TEMP. L. REV. 1333, 1333-34 (1994) (citing Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969)).
106. Joshua A. Bloom, Comment, The Use of Local Ordinances to Combat Private Club
Discrimination, 23 U.S.F. L. REV. 473,473 (1989) (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449,460 (1958)).
107. Varela, supra note 97, at 932-33 (citing Note, Discrimination in Access To Public Places: A
Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. CHANGE 215
(1978)). State PAAs have historically been a more effective tool in fighting discrimination, and were
enacted to fill in the gap created when the Supreme Court struck down the first federal PAA in In Re Civil
Rights Cases. See generally id.
108. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
109. Id. at 617-29. For a critical discussion of these two tests, see Robert N. Johnson, Note, Board of
Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club ofDuarte: Redefining Associational Rights, 1998 BYU
L. REV. 141 (1988).
110. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29.
Ill. Id. at 618-22.
and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships ... from
unjustified interference by the State.""' 2 When a group claims to be an intimate
association, the Court assesses factors such as "size, purpose, policies, selectivity,
congeniality and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent."' 3
While intimate associations include relationships such as those between family
members, Justice Brennan declined to "identify associations other than the family
which may meet his standards for privacy protection."" 4
The second test considers whether a group is an expressive association.5
"'Expressive association' is the right to come together as a group to exercise First
Amendment rights such as speaking or worshipping."'"6 This right is implicit in
the rights of expression which are protected by the First Amendment." 7 It is
recognized when an association gathers in the pursuit of "political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." '' " In Roberts, the Court
reluctantly admitted, prior to its holding, that "there can be no clearer example of
an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation
that forces the group to accept members it does not desire. . . . Freedom of
association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate:""' 9
To justify the Jaycees' loss of autonomy, the Court devised a nexus
requirement: courts may only curtail a private organization's autonomy if the
forced inclusion of an unwanted member of the group either modifies the groups
message or dilutes its purpose. 20 Because this standard essentially lets courts
determine whether the inclusion would change the group's message, it results in
courts making a determination of what a group's message is-a task more suited
for the groups themselves. Hence, an association's First Amendment rights will
be held completely inoperative unless some nexus exists between the
organization's practices and the message or purpose of the group. Not
surprisingly, the Court has determined it is the appropriate authority to make that
112. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925) (discussing the degree to which the courts
may intrude upon the parent's choices in upbringing their children). In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court
determined that such freedoms emanate from the "penumbra" of rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights.
Johnson, supra note 109, at 144-45 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1964)).
113. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
114. Linder, supra note 32, at 1885. Such an omission is neither unintentional nor surprising,
considering Justice Brennan's judicial history as a rights-oriented egalitarian. By enumerating any other
association other than the family which would qualify for protection as an intimate association, Justice
Brennan would have run the risk of narrowing the expansive application he was enunciating.
115. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-29.
116. Lisa A. Hammond, Note, Boy Scouts and Non-Believers: The Constitutionality of Preventing
Discrimination, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385, 1388 (1992).
117. Marissa L. Goodman, Note, A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean, Trustworthy... And
Heterosexual? Gays in the Boy Scouts of America, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 825, 839-40 (1999).
118. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (citations omitted).
119. Id.
120. Varela, supra note 97, at 929.
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determination."'
Justice O'Connor argued that it is impossible to pigeon-hole a group as being
entirely expressive or non-expressive, and thus a better approach would be to
determine whether the association is commercial, and to then proceed with the
analysis from that point.'22 Under any legal explanation, however, any judicial
intrusion reduces the vitality of intermediate associations-intimate, expressive,
and even religious 2 3-and must therefore take its place alongside the other factors
Putnam listed as culprits for America's declining social capital." While as a
121. An example of such a restriction on the Court's intrusionary powers would be forcing the KKK to
accept black people as part of their organization. When the KKK sued the city of Thurmont, Maryland,
challenging a nondiscrimination condition in the parade permit, the Court held as follows:
If ever there was a case where the membership and the message were coextensive, it is here. The
KKK is certainly organized for specific expressive purposes. The KKK desires to convince
others of the need for segregation of the races and to send the message of white supremacy...
. Further, the KKK's message of white separatism would be destroyed if blacks were to march
with them.... The group's primary purpose is to advocate one main concept-that blacks and
whites should not mix. Allowing blacks to march with the KKK would change the primary
message which the KKK advocates.
Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor, 700 F. Supp. 281, 289 (D. Md. 1988).
122. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635. Justice O'Connor argued:
No association is likely ever to be exclusively engaged in expressive activities, if only because
it will collect dues from its members or purchase printing materials or rent lecture halls or serve
coffee and cakes at its meetings .... [Therefore] an association should be characterized as
commercial, and subject to rationally related state regulation of its membership and other
associational activities, when, and only when, the association's activities are not predominately
of the type protected by the First Amendment.
Id.
123. Mary Ann Glendon is very critical of rights-oriented egalitarian decisions which have fostered a
"winner-takes-all attitude." Kommers, supra note 78, at 1350. Perhaps the greatest victims in this judicial
intrusion are America's religions. See generally id. Glendon has written that Everson v. Board of
Education, a watershed First Amendment case, has "metastasized into something more akin to antagonism
toward religion than the religious freedom that the free exercise clause was clearly meant to privilege. At
issue here, as many other critics of the Court's church-state cases have pointed out, is no less than the health
of the body politic." Kommers, supra note 78, at 1348. Glendon elaborates on this theme as follows:
What seems to have paved the way for this remarkable inversion of meaning was the inability
of Court majorities to grasp that, for millions of Americans, religious freedom is "exercised"
within worshipping communities. The justices lost sight of the fact that the religion language
of the First Amendment protected individuals' free exercise, not only when they were alone, but
in their religious associations and institutions.
Raul F. Yanes and Mary Ann Glendon, How to Restore Religious Freedom: A Debate, FIRSTTHINGS, Apr.
1992, at 47.
124. Putnam, supra note 44, at 3. On a personal note, in making these assertions, I am in no way
condoning the practice of discrimination against individuals based upon race, religion, sexual orientation,
gender, or any other demographic group. Where such discrimination exists, it is unfortunate and divisive.
However, such discrimination is also an unfortunate and irascible byproduct of the freedom to associate.
While I applaud governmental attempts to prevent and avoid the placement of its imprimatur on any public
act ofdiscrimination, judicial restraint is often necessary to permit the very behaviors we abhor, in the name
of allowing freedom, precisely the paradox mentioned earlier in the text.
society we tolerate these intrusions to achieve what we dem worthwhile goals, such
as the eradication of discrimination, at a minimum we must be honest with
ourselves and frankly admit that such intrusions necessarily occasion a
concomitant reduction in First Amendment Rights.
C. Other Cases Involving the Boy Scouts of America
Some of the most highly-publicized right of association cases have involved
BSA.'25 While Dale'26 was decided in June, 2000, several other watershed right
of association cases have also been wagered by BSA.'27
Founded in 1910, BSA's Official Scoutmaster Handbook states the purpose
of the organization: "The purpose of the Boy Scouts of America is to help boys
become honorable men." 2 ' One historian remarked that "this handbook is among
the[] very few remaining popular repositories of something like classical ethics,
deriving from Aristotle and Cicero .... In the current world of Making It and
Getting Away with It, there are not many books devoted to associating happiness
with virtue."'29
1. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts
In Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts ofAmerica,3" the issue
addressed by the California Supreme Court was whether "the state may
constitutionally require an expressive association to accept as a moral teacher for
its youth adult members expressing a moral view contrary to that of the
associations."'' Prior to applying to become an Assistant Scoutmaster, Timothy
Curran gave an interview to the press in which he said he was "proud of being
125. In the first articles of incorporation filed in 1910, BSA stated that their organization's purpose was
"to promote, through organization, and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do things for
themselves and others, to train them in Scoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and
kindred virtues, using the methods which are in common use by Boy Scouts." Varela, supra note 97, at 943
(citing R. PETERSON, THE BOY SCours: AN AMERICAN ADVENTURE 32 (1984)).
126. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
127. See, e.g., Curran v. Mount Diablo of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998) and Welsh
v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
128. Varela, supra note 97, at 944 (citing BOY Scours OF AMERICA, THE OFFICIAL SCOUTMASTER
HANDBOOK 98 (7th ed. 1986)). The Scout Law is as follows: "A Scout Is: Trustworthy. Loyal. Helpful.
Friendly. Courteous. Kind. Cheerful. Thrifty. Brave. Clean. Reverent." William Hillcourt, THE
OFFICIAL BOY SCOUT HANDBOOK 31 (9th ed. 1979).
129. Varela, supra note 97, at 944 (quoting P. Fussell, THE BOY SCour HANDBOOK AND OTHER
OBSERVATIONS 6-7 (1982)).
130. 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998). Timothy Curran was represented, not surprisingly, by Beatrice Dohm
of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Mark D. Rosenbaum of the ACLU of Southern
California. See id. at 219. The BSA was represented by George Davidson of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed.
See id.
131. Appellant's Answer Brief at 3, Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., Case
No. 2 Civ. B061869 at 3 (hereinafter "Answer Brief').
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gay-someone who didn't just say it, but who acted on it."'3 Because California's
Unruh Civil Rights Act'33 prohibits arbitrary discrimination against homosexuals
by "all commercial and noncommercial entities open to and serving the general
public," Curran argued that BSA was a commercial establishment and thus subject
to the strictures of the Act. 134
While the lower court ruled against BSA, the California Supreme Court sided
with BSA, holding that they did not constitute a business for purposes of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act and, thus, were exempt from the application of public
accommodation statutes. 35  The Court, in essence, was deciding whether a
voluntary organization should be forced to accept a member who holds "a view
[that] conflicts with its official position that homosexuality is immoral.' 36
Because the court found that BSA did not qualify as a "business establishment" for
purposes of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, it found no reason to further address the
issue of whether BSA qualified as an expressive association. 37 While a critical
analysis of freedom of association cases generally yields a very ominous outlook
for the autonomy of intermediate organizations, the Curran holding reflects a
comprehension of the importance of these organizations, as well as a
Tocquevellian appreciation for leaving them alone.13
132. Answer Brief at 3. Curran sought to change Scouting's views by advancing what he called the
"revolutionary" view that an Eagle Scout, "the epitome of what is good and wholesome and moral in
American Society... is willing to publicly admit that he is homosexual." Answer Brief at 4.
133. California's Unruh Civil Rights Act provides in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex,
race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin or disability or medical condition are entitled to
the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2000). If a California organization falls within the penumbra of the Unruh
Civil Rights Act, state courts have held that public accommodation acts may properly be applied to the
organization, with very few exceptions.
134. Curran went to great lengths to describe BSA in terms of a commercial establishment:
[Respondent] has significant financial responsibilities. It owns and maintains a large physical
plant which includes a central administrative building andfourcamps.... It oversees an annual
budget in excess of $1.7 million. It has business-like sources of revenue. It also sponsors
various revenue raising activities . . . sells T-shirts and patches bearings its name and
participates in the selection and sale of [Boy Scout] uniforms, equipment, publication[s] and
other official Scouting paraphernalia. And it incurs business-like expenses for items such as
overhead, furniture and equipment depreciation, insurance, auditing and public relations.
Answer Brief at 6.
135. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 219-220 (Cal. 1998).
136. Id. at 219 (alteration in original).
137. Id.
138. Incidentally, the morality of homosexual conduct was not broached at all in these opinions, a proper
choice considering the applicable case law.
2. Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America
Another highly-publicized case dealing with parallel facts is Welsh v. Boy
Scouts of America. 139 Mark Welsh was a seven-year-old boy who desired to join
the Boy Scouts, but refused to sign the application due to its requirement that the
applicant commit to doing one's "duty to God.""'' He filed suit against the Boy
Scouts after being informed that agreeing with this statement was a prerequisite
to becoming a member. The district court, and later the Seventh Circuit, held that
BSA was not a place of public accommodation for the purposes of Title II and
therefore could exclude Mark Welsh from becoming a member.'' This holding
was widely criticized by those who felt that the Boy Scouts should be treated as an
expressive organization, because no nexus exists between the group's exclusion
and its message. 4"
Ironically, much of the criticism about Welsh centered around the fact that
there is no mention of God in BSA's congressional charter or the handbook, as
Justice Stevens also later discussed in Dale.'43 Such a dialectic, however, is
unfortunately tautological. These critics, in essence, argue that BSA-an
organization that does not admit athiests because of the central place of God in the
organization is not realy serious about its institutional beliefs.' Interestingly, it
makes the tenuous assumption that an organization must place all of its purposes
and beliefs about which it is "serious" in a congressional charter or handbook, and
any "ultra vires" action is therefore ipsofacto prohibited. 45
139. 742 F. Supp. 1413 (N.D. I11.) (1990).
140. ld. at 1418.
141. Edward Bigham, Seventh Circuit Permits Boy Scouts ofAmerica to Exclude Athiest- Welsh v. Boy
Scouts ofAmerica, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1333, 1345-46 (1994).
142. See generally Lisa A. Hammond, Boy Scouts and Non-Believers: The Constitutionality of
Preventing Discrimination, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385 (1992) (criticizing the Seventh Circuit's decision to not
apply Title II to the Boy Scouts and stating that BSA should be considered an expressive group for First
Amendment analysis).
143. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2462 (2000).
144. This flawed logic was best regurgitated in an article by Lisa A. Hammond:
This statement of purpose from the Boy Scouts shows that Boy Scouts engage in expressive
activities, such as teaching patriotism and courage. Glaringly absent, however, is any mention
of "religion" or "duty to God" in this purpose statement, which was approved by Congress when
it chartered the Boy Scouts. This weighs against the Boy Scouts' strenuous arguments that one
of its primary purposes is to promote religious ideas for young boys.
Hammond, supra note 142, at 1393. The circular logic of Ms. Hammond is as follows: plaintiff was not
allowed admission into the BSA precisely because of the importance of God in the organization, and now
plaintiff seeks to categorize BSA as an expressive organization because of the fact that God is not all that
important to the group. See id.
145. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), the Supreme Court, quoting Thomas
Jefferson, stated that "the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions." This
concept, commonly referred to as the "belief-action" distinction," has been given ample legal attention in
First Amendment cases for over a hundred years. However, often excluded is the fact that government
powers reach actions, which, in turn, directly affect beliefs. This concept is demonstrated by analyzing the
960
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If the critics' reasoning was followed, the likely result would be the next
logical step, reducing the First Amendment rights of intermediate associations by
giving courts a nearly unbridled power over membership activities of private
organizations. In spite of these two BSA holdings-which would doubtless be
pleasing to de Tocqueville, Rousseau, and Aquinas-the damage is still largely
done: many voluntary associations now alter their policies and creeds at merely
the threat of litigation. For instance, instead of facing a lawsuit, the Woman's
National Democratic Club agreed to allow men to become full voting members."4
The Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) is facing similar pressure.47
As Douglas Linder presciently observed:
When the last all-women's private school is forced to close its doors,
when the law no longer tolerates the existence of all-Norwegian or all-
Catholic clubs, when the Boys Scouts and the Girl Scouts finally merge,
even those of us calling ourselves egalitarians may stop to shed a tear or
two for pluralism lost. 48
place of polygamy in Latter-day Saint ("LDS") (or "Mormon") theology over the last 100 years. The
Supreme Court outlawed polygamy in 1878 in Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In
response to a collective cognitive dissonance, some scholars have argued that LDS theology (or "beliefs")
slowly evolved to conform to what the law required (or "action"). Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Once a
Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study
Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295 (1998). This was done, they argue, out
of self-preservation, considering the intense persecution and official extermination order which was issued
against them by the state of Missouri. Id. If government action can, over a period of time, arguably
catalyze a change in the beliefs of a religious body who holds their beliefs to be divinely-inspired, how much
greater must the impact of government intrusion be upon the policies of a non-religious, voluntary
organization? In favoring belief, the Supreme Court, in essence, unfortunately tends to "[prefer] one side
of a religious debate." id.
146. Varela, supra note 97, at 937. The strategy of using lawsuits as scare tactics is now in full force.
The Woman's National Democratic Club and two other all female private clubs were threatened with
litigation based on Washington's antidiscrimination laws. Rather than go through this costly procedure,
they merely changed their policy, admitting men as full voting members. See id.
147. See id.
148. Linder, supra note 98, at 1902. Itistruly ironic that those chanting the mantra ofpluralism as the
highest virtue in society also tend to be egalitarians. While there are beneficial qualities to both pluralism
and egalitarianism, most who espouse one of them also espouse the other-without realizing that
fundamentally the two are in irreconcilable conflict. This may be reconciled by recognizing that while the
state necessarily treats all people equally, it allows intermediate organizations, for better or for *'orse, the
freedom to discriminate.
VII. COMMUNITARIANISM: RECONCILING RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
A. Fundamentals of Communitarianism
While Communitarianism originally appeared as a "critique of John Rawls'
seminal statement of contemporary liberalism," '49 it has since burgeoned into a
school of thought reacting to the insular individualism which has spawned a
"manufacturing of new rights. ' 'ts While many academics view Individualism and
Communitarianism at opposite ends of the legal spectrum, with an ideal mix
located in the middle (somewhat reminiscent of Aristotle's golden mean), true
Communitarianism is neither extreme nor impractical.' 5' It merely practices what
political theorists from Aristotle, Rousseau, and Tocqueville to the present have
preached-a refocusing of our collective dialogue from the notion of "self," to that
of the "collective self," or "group."' 52 Political philosophers have charged that
liberalism is "atomistic," or based on the ontological premise "that individual
identity exists prior to any social context."'53 Communitarians dispute this notion
of a "pre-social" or "unencumbered" self, noting that it is inherent in Locke's
"state of nature" and Rawl's "original position."'
Over the past decade, "contemporary legal theory has been dominated by
149. Kraig James Powell, The Other Double Standard: Communitarianism, Federalism andAmerican
Constitutional Law, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 69, 71 (1996).
150. AMrrIA ETZiONI, THE SPIRrr OF COMMUNITY 5 (1993). Etzioni has pleaded:
We should, for a transition period of, say, the next decade, put a tight lid on the manufacturing
of new rights. The incessant issuance of new rights, like the wholesale printing of currency,
causes a massive inflation of rights that devalues their moral claims .... The champion of rights
are often quite mum on (the question of who will pay for the rights], which if left unanswered
makes the claim for a right a rather empty gesture.
Id. (alteration in original). Etzioni gives an example of this manufacturing as follows:
Tajel Shah, the president of the U.S. Student Association, claims that higher education "is a
right, not a privilege." A fine sentiment indeed. It would, however, be more responsible if she
at least hinted at how this right is to be paid for-in whose ledger the entailed obligation is to be
entered.
Id.
151. Kevin J. Worthen, The Role of Local Governments in Striking The Proper Balance Between
Individualism and Communitarianism: Lessonsforand FromAmericans, 1993 BYUL. REV. 475 (1993).
152. Sullivan, supra note 30, at 1715.
153. Powell, supra note 149, at 72.
154. Communitarians argue that such an atomistic view of the self is also unrealistic. Powell explains
that:
Contemporary liberal theorists have typically responded to these communitarian criticisms by
conceding the incoherence of the notion ofan unencumbered self. Liberals explain that concepts
such as the pre-social self who enters civil society with a fully-formed identity were never meant
to be metaphysical or ontological descriptions of psychological reality, but were instead mere
rhetorical devices developed to demonstrate the injustice of certain political arrangements.
Id. at 73 (citing Stephen Holmes, The Permanent Structure ofAntiliberal Thought, LIBERALISM AND THE
MORAL LIFE 227, 237 (Nancy L. Ruinblum ed. 1989).
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discussion of community."' While in the sixties this word animated a generation
which frequently resembled "a Hobbesian war of all against all," it currently is
used to "suggest an antidote to the perceived evils of modern Western liberalism
.... ,, In fact, the debate between Communitarianism and Individualism has
often been compared to thought-up disputes between Hegel and Kant, or even
Rousseau and Locke.'57 "Communitarianism maintains that one's most important
obligations come from membership in a community and cannot be explained by
the individualistic model."'58
While Communitarianism's underlying philosophy has been dismissed as
being characterized by mere nostalgia for simpler days, its essence is "rootlessness
and unbelongingness."'59 In essence, Communitarianism is viewed by its devotees
as the means by which intermediate associations may be strengthened and by
which families may be further buffered from the influence of an egalitarian, rights-
oriented government."
B. Founding of Communitarianism
The Communitarian Network was founded by sociologist Amitai Etzioni,
Professor of American Studies at George Washington University.' 6' This group
is the Washington-based think tank for the Communitarian movement. It has an
activist arm which implements its policies on a grassroots level: the American
Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities.62 The Network also has a regular
journal, The Responsive Community. Dr. Etzioni argues, as was discussed
previously, that the United States has become a place where civic rights no longer
accompany civic responsibilities. 63
This unbalanced focus creates an emphasis on the individual, and
155. Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685,686
(1992).
156. David Schuman, Book Review, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 297, 297 (1994) (reviewing Daniel Bell,
COMMUNITARIANISM AND rrs CRIrics).
157. See Friedel, supra note 81, at 3, available at http://www.student-online.de/Hausarbeiten.
158. Robert Justin Lipkin, Progressivism as Communitarian Democracy, 4 WIDENER L. SYMp. J. 229,
240(1999).
159. James W. Torke, What Price Belonging: An Essay on Groups, Community, and the Constitution,
24 IND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
160. Worthy of mention is the fact that many Communitarians favor a more expansive notion of the
federal government's role in its citizen's lives.
161. In 1991, the press began referring to Dr. Etzioni as the "guru" of the communitarian movement.
See Amitai Etzioni-Short Biography, available at http://www.gwu.edu/cgi-bin/texiswebinator/searchL.
162. David B. Kopel, Communitarians, Neorepublicans, and Guns: Assessing the Case for Firearms
Prohibition, 56 MD. L. REV. 438,443-44 (1997).
163. Id. at 443.
simultaneously erodes the intermediate organizations which have buffered the
family from the government."6 Through restoring those responsibilities, the social
capital is replenished. In fact, the Communitarian Network's slogan is "strong
rights presume strong responsibilities."'65
Three things separate Communitarianism from other political movements.
First, it arguably contains a general thesis for what it intends to accomplish and
how it intends to accomplish the task."6 Second, it has grass-roots vehicles
through which its agenda is implemented, and thus escapes the confines of the
ivory tower-something fatal to most political movements. '67 Third, its philosophy
transcends traditional liberal/conservative labels." s  This is why the term
"doctrinaire Communitarianism" is oxymoronic: the movement is arguably more
an eclectic collection of views than any cohesive set of absolutes.
While Communitarianism and Liberalism tend to be seen as opposites, it is
interesting to note that the Communitarians have exercised a great deal of
influence upon the Clinton Administration.'69 William Galson, one of the
movement's founders, was one of the drafters of candidate Clinton's "New
Covenant" speech. 7 Most interesting, and perplexing to many, is the fact that
Dr. Etzioni has opined that President Clinton is "a Communitarian to the core."'
7
'1
It is a testament to the movement's eclecticism that a President who most view as
an able rights-oriented egalitarianist could be viewed, by the movement's founder
himself, as a true Communitarian' 72 Nonetheless, in his highly-regarded book,
The Spirit of Community, Professor Etzioni describes Communitarianism simply
as "a social movement aim[ed] at shoring up the moral, social, and political
environment."' 73 Its appeal is to what Lincoln called "the better angels of our
nature." '
C. The Communitarian Platform
In its formative stage, the Communitarian Network tendered a platform for
the rejuvenation of intermediate associations which was signed by hundreds of
political groups and prominent individuals.'75 It comprises the "mission
164. See supra Part 11.




169. See id. at 443-44.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 444.
172. Id.
173. Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet Responsibilities, 30
WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 649,652 (1995).
174. The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, The Communitarian
Network, available at http://128.164.127.251 /-ccps/RCPlatform.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2001).
175. See id.
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statement" of the movement, complete with both theory and practical suggestions
for its implementation.'76 It begins as follows:
American men, women, and children are members of many
communities-families; neighborhoods; innumerable social, religious,
ethnic, -work place, and professional associations; and the body politic
itself.... A communitarian perspective recognizes that the preservation
of individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of the institutions
of civil society where citizens learn respect for others as well as self-
respect.... A communitarian perspective recognizes that communities
and polities, too, have obligations-including the duty to be responsive to
their members and to foster participation and deliberation in social and
political life."m
This platform then lists the basics Communitarian tenets.7 ' First, restoring
the moral voice, beginning with the family. "Moral education," they posit, "is not
a task that can be delegated to baby sitters, or even professional child-care centers.
... Child-raising is important, valuable work, work that must be honored rather
than denigrated by both parents and the community."'7 Next, schools act as the
second line of defense."8 "The fear that our children will be 'brainwashed' by a
few educators is farfetched .... For one way or another, moral education does
take place in schools. The only question is whether schools and teachers will
passively stand by, or take an active and responsible role .... 181
The platform then discusses the strengthening of communities:
The ancient Greeks understood this well: A person who is
completely private is lost to civic life.... Generally, no social task
should be assigned to an institution that is larger than necessary to
do the job. What can be done by families, should not be assigned to
an intermediate group-school etc .... [T]o remove tasks to higher
176. See id.
177. Preamble, The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, The
CommunitarianNetwork,availableathttp://128.164.127.251/-CCPS/RCPlatform.html (lastvisitedApr.
22,2001).
178. The Responsive Communitarian Platform, The Communitarian Network, available at




levels than is necessary weakens the constituent communities."
The specific methods of accomplishing these results are then listed: keeping the
polity informed, endorsing campaign finance reform, favoring sobriety
checkpoints, supporting gun control for the public safety, supporting the spread
of democracy globally, and opposing the curtailment of First Amendment
freedoms of expression.'
While this document comprises the keystone of the Communitarian platform,
myriad position papers are also available further detailing specific issues. Some
of the topics which Communitarians have discussed at length are the relationship
of religion to moral education in the public schools, responsible fathering,
undergraduate education, and the development of moral and civic responsibility.'1
D. Habits of the Heart: Building Blocks for Communitarians
In the 1830s, de Tocqueville referred to Americans' "Habits of the Heart,"
which included their focus on family, on religion, on civic duty, and civic
responsibility.' Communitarianism represents one of the most vibrant and
feasible attempts to restore to American civic society, in part, the concept to which
de Tocqueville may have been referring. It is a revolutionary attempt to reconcile,
in a sense, our positive laws with the natural law, and simply remind both
individuals and communities what those laws are. As Aquinas phrased it,
"[E]very human law has just so much of the nature of law as is derived from the
law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer
a law but a perversion of law."'" It may well be said of intrusive egalitarian laws
which contribute to a decline in social capital what both Augustine and Martin
Luther King, Jr. have said: an unjust law is really no law at all. 7
Communitarians seek to ensure that our legal structure is composed of bona fide
"laws." While all citizens cannot participate in the American government to the
extent that people participated in the idealized Greek polis, Communitarians seek




184. See generally Warren A. Nord and Charles C. Haynes, The Relationship of Religion to Moial
Education in the Public Schools (I); William J. Doherty and Martha F. Erickson, Responsible Fathering:
An Overview, Conceptual Framework, and Recommendations for Policies and Programs; and Anne
Colby et al., Undergraduate Education and the Development of Moral and Civil Responsibility,
available at http:1128.164.127.251/-ccps.html/RCPlatform.html (last visited Apr. 22, 200 1).
185. DE TocQuEviLua, supra note 2, at 49.
186. Natural Law, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, athttp://www.utm.edu/research/iep (citing ST
I-I1, Q.95, A11) (last visited Apr. 22, 2001).
187. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In 1944, Judge Learned Hand captured the centrality of civic dispositions, or
habits of the heart, as follows:
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no
constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no
court can even do much to help it. While it lies there, it need no
constitution, no law, no court to save it.'8
A cavalier reliance on laws as a means of securing and retaining liberty is a path
brimming with failure, but yet a necessary evil when social capital declines. It is
interesting to note the inversely proportional relationship between the habits of the
heart and the letter of the law. The less habits of the heart tend to act as guides for
the civic actions of men and women (namely, a collective decrease in Jefferson's
"obedience to the unenforceable"), the more positive laws must be enacted to
safeguard collective liberty 89
As discussed earlier, the needs of society are met through three primary
organizations: government, family, and intermediate organizations, or buffer
organizations. To utilize the pie metaphor, when one of the three groups (or
"pieces") gains in power, the collective power of the three organizations does not
likewise increase. The size of the pie stays the same, as it is essentially a zero-sum
game. Such an increase only necessitates a corresponding decrease in the size of
the other pieces. The objective is thus to maintain a healthy balance in the sizes
of the three pieces."9 The relative shrinking size of the pie piece corresponding
to intermediate associations, in comparison to the other pieces, is what Robert
Putnam referred by diminishing social capital.
The perpetual quest of the ideal comparative sizes, so to speak, is fraught with
painful paradoxes. The rise of a liberal egalitarianism has also "diminish[ed]
America's cultural richness and pluralism."'' Those preaching the doctrine of
multiculturalism, instead of teaching a "shar[ed] civic culture to which every
group has contributed," have merely put down everything American and taught
188. Branson and Quigley, supra note 4 (citing Learned Hand's remarks made in New York in 1944).
189. As a society, we have disdained the very organizations that attempt to instill respect and "obedience
to the unenforceable," and we have reaped the whirlwind-the current proliferation of positive laws.
190. This is not to say that the respective pieces of the pie ought to be similar in size, metaphorically
speaking. On the contrary, a "perfect" balance between the competing pieces-if such a concept exists-likely
consists in three pieces of very different sizes.
191. Linder, supra note 32, at 1902.
that common culture is a sham.192 As a country we tolerate the increasing
implementation of insular and individualistic policies, yet marvel at the worldwide
trend toward tribalism. 9 3
Professor Etzioni has recommended the following: "[T]he sociological trick
is to leave some room for enriching particulars while sustaining the shared values,
habits of the heart, institutions, and public policies that keep the various
communities as members in the more encompassing community, the American
society .... 'E. Pluribus Unum' may not be equal to the task."'"
For this reason, Professor Etzioni recommends that we view America not as
a melting pot, or as a rainbow, but as a "mosaic."' 95 As human beings, we are
innately social animals, and we gain a sense of our collective human potential, as
well as an increased ability to reach that potential, through interaction with
others. 96 This simple fact, which has animated Communitarianism, also led
Aristotle thousands of years ago to hypothesize that "the person without
community is either a beast or a god."' 97 "In the end, given liberty to learn, men
will find out that freedom means community."' 98
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192. Etzioni, supra note 150, at 150.
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Id.
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(1993) (citing ARISTOTLE, POLrrics 37 (Bk. 11, ch. 4 (1 277bl 5)) (Carnes Lord trans., 1984)).
198. Raeder, supra note 58, at 519 (quoting William Ay!ott Orton).
199. J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law, 2000.
